comment attempts to set forth such a set of principles to govern the exercise of long arm jurisdiction." Rejecting the balancing approach, it first outlines the three requirements that ensure adequate due process protection to nonresident defendants. These minimum requirements-causation, notice, and relevance-allow states wide latitude in asserting long arm jurisdiction. Using commercial cases as an illustration, the comment then considers additional limitations on long arm jurisdiction mandated by other provisions of the Constitution and necessary because of the nature of the defendant's underlying conduct.
I.
A PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR JURISDICTIONAL
ANALYSIS

A. Minimum Contacts and State Long Arm Statutes
The due process clause permits a state to exercise jurisdiction only where "minimum contacts" exist between the defendant and the forum.' This requirement protects a defendant from "the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum" 10 by ensuring that it is "reasonable" to require him to defend the suit in the forum state. 1 1 The minimum contacts rule also protects the "orderly administration of the laws ' 12 by preventing states from "reach [ing] out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system. causes of action related to the in-state effects of a defendant's activities." 6 
B. A Balancing Test Versus Fixed Rules
It generally is agreed that a state cannot assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant unless at least three conditions are satisfied: the defendant must have caused an effect in the forum, 17 he must have had fair notice at the time of his act that it would cause an effect in the forum, 18 and that effect must be related to "[a] court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States." CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973) . Statutes in most states are more restrictive, typically enumerating specific events and transactions-doing business in the state, committing a tort or causing a tortious effect in the state, owning property in the state-and providing that causes of action arising from these acts support personal jurisdiction over nonresidents involved in them. See, e.g ., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 302 (McKinney 1972) . In states that specify particular contacts, two questions must be answered when jurisdiction is asserted under a long arm statute: whether the contact falls within the scope of the statute, and if so, whether the state's exercise of jurisdiction is constitutional. F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.14 (2d ed. 1977). The practical differences between the two approaches may be slight. The Minnesota statute specifies particular contacts, MINN. STAT. REV. § 543.19 (West Supp. 1980 ), but has been interpreted "to assert in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents to the maximum extent consistent with due-process." Marquette Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Minn. 1978) .
15 The rules and principles outlined in this comment are irrelevant to determining whether a state may assert general jurisdiction over a defendant. In deciding this question, the court must examine the entire relationship between the defendant and the forum, not just the elements of that relationship connected to the particular cause of action. The consensus among courts 2 1 and commentators, 2 2 however, is that a balancing test should be used to determine whether a state may extend its long arm to a particular defendant. Typically, the defendant's interest in not being unfairly haled before a foreign court 2 " is balanced against the plaintiff's interest in his chosen forum, 4 the judicial system's interest in having the suit tried in the forum state, 2 5 and the forum's interest in asserting jurisdiction.
2 6 Some advocates of balancing propose a two-step approach whereby a court first determines whether a defendant knowingly caused a relevant event to occur within the forum; if he did, the court then balances the factors outlined above to determine the "fairness" of asserting jurisdiction. 7 Others propose forgoing the 19 See text and notes at notes 86-91 infra. The relevance requirement serves a purpose more akin to federalism than fairness, permitting jurisdiction only where an event gives the state a legitimate interest in the cause of action. inquiry; once the court has determined that the defendant caused a relevant effect in the forum, it uses balancing alone to decide whether to assert jurisdiction. 2 The balancing approach has two fundamental flaws. First, because it is unpredictable, it offers no guidance to persons seeking to avoid being subject to a state's jurisdiction. 29 Each decision is too fact-bound for general application, and the weight given to each competing variable is left to the discretion of individual judges. Given this discretion, state courts often resolve close cases in their own favor, thereby steadily and inappropriately expanding jurisdiction. 3 0 Moreover, because the balancing approach considers factors the defendant can neither anticipate nor control, it is impossible for individuals to predict with any certainty where their conduct will render them subject to suit. gives a degree of predictability to the legal system"). World-Wide seems to move away from traditional balancing because of its unpredictability. Although the Court acknovledged the competing variables in due process analysis, id. at 292, it focused on the defendant's contacts with the forum, finding "a total absence of those affiliating circumstances that are a necessary predicate to any exercise of state-court jurisdiction," id. at 295. Justice Brennan in dissent criticized the Court for not weighing other factors and noted that the Court previously had "declined to establish a mechanical test based on the quantum of contacts between a State and the defendant. . . ." Id. at 300 (construing Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) 31 Even proponents of balancing admit that predictability is impossible. California Note, supra note 16, at 630 ("One cannot deny that the balancing approach grants the courts a great deal of discretion. In addition, it creates a sizeable amount of uncertainty due to the inconsistencies that are liable to result from a court's balancing of various considerations.").
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Long Arm Jurisdiction courts have suggested considering the plaintiff's indigency and inability to travel to sue the defendant elsewhere. 3 2 Because defendants cannot anticipate the wealth of potential plaintiffs, such equitable concerns undermine predictability.
The second flaw of the balancing approach is that the factors balanced have no constitutional relevance. A plaintiff's poverty, for example, has no apparent connection to the constitutional question of the defendant's amenability to suit.
3 3 Similarly, variations on the reach of long arm jurisdiction that are based on the character of the defendant's conduct" are inconsistent with principled due process analysis. Where a defendant's conduct is intentionally tortious or of little social value, courts do not hesitate to assert jurisdiction if the minimum due process requirements of causation, notice, and relevance are met. 5 Although protection of some conduct might be compelled by other constitutional provisions, 3 
1982]
that depend on the perceived social utility of the defendant's activities. Considerations of general convenience-the plaintiff's, the defendant's, and the judicial system's-also lack constitutional foundation. Such considerations are instead the cornerstone of the discretionary doctrine of forum non conveniens, which is unrelated to a forum's power over a defendant.
The weight of the forum's interest in asserting jurisdiction also is irrelevant to its power to do so. Within constitutional bounds, a state legislature has the right to decide which actions causing instate effects it wishes to regulate in its courts." 8 When a court restricts the reach of a state's long arm statute on the ground that the state has an insufficient interest in asserting jurisdiction, 9 it usurps that right by substituting its judgment for that of the state's legislature.
Finally, the factor most commonly invoked in balancing analyses-a state's interest in providing its own residents with a forum 4 q-is also of doubtful constitutional legitimacy. If the purpose of due process protection is to ensure that persons can avoid suits in foreign states, 48 unpredictable and nonconstitutionally-based balancing tests should be rejected. Due process analysis should be governed instead by a body of fixed rules. Part II outlines a uniform body of rules governing causation, notice, and relevance that defines the extent of an individual's protection from a foreign state's authority and, by implication, the extent to which a state can protect itself from foreign individuals' acts that will affect it. Further restrictions on jurisdiction are legitimate only when there is a separate constitutional limitation on the state's power to regulate the defendant's underlying conduct.
This analysis still requires that courts consider the nature of the defendants' activities, 4 but it provides a constitutional basis for doing so. Thus, additional restraints imposed in commercial cases, for example, should not be based on fairness to the defendant, 5 for he had the opportunity to protect himself from the au- Redish's analysis goes both too far and not far enough. If he is correct, the fifth amendment's due process clause should limit federal jurisdiction to forums convenient for the defendant, and the fourteenth amendment's due process clause should limit state jurisdiction over its residents to convenient localities within the state. Yet Congress has authorized nationwide service of process for certain actions in the federal courts, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976) (interpleader), and the Supreme Court in dictum noted Congress's power to do so in Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946) . Moreover, no court has ever read the fourteenth amendment's due process clause as prohibiting a state from forcing its residents to litigate in an inconvenient state court. See R. WmNmAu, supra note 16, § 4.7, at 17-18 ("Within the state ... there is, so far as due process is concerned, statewide jurisdiction once the required state nexus is found."). See also Aguchak v. Montgomery Ward Co., 520 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1974). Furthermore, the due process clause is not concerned solely with convenience. As the Court noted in World-Wide, even where it is convenient for a defendant to litigate in a foreign forum, a state cannot assert jurisdiction over him if he has no contacts with it. 444 U.S. at 294.
The principle of jurisdictional due process proposed here preserves the territorial jurisdiction rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). Under the proposed principle, a person can avoid a foreign state's jurisdiction by forgoing acts that he anticipates will cause an effect there. The principle also preserves for states the power, recognized in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) , to require persons who knowingly cause effects in the state to consent to amenability to suit for those acts.
44 For courts that have done so, see cases cited supra note 34. 45 See, e.g., Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596, 603 n.12 (7th Cir. 1979 ) (possibility of discouraging interstate transactions underscores unfairness of asserting jurisdiction over out-of-state defendant who has only attenuated contractual links with forum), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980). thority of the foreign state; nor should the restraints be based on the forum state's lack of interest in asserting jurisdiction over the defendant, 4 for there are many reasons why a state might want to regulate commercial conduct that affects it. Rather, the restrictions should be justified by constitutional limitations on a state's power to regulate interstate commerce. 47 Rules implementing this analysis are developed in part III.
This approach-fixing uniform minimum due process requirements and adding to them only where required by other constitutional provisions-serves several important purposes. It ensures that state jurisdiction is limited only by the Constitution's restrictions, subject to which a state should be free to regulate in its courts whatever foreign acts it wishes. Moreover, it preserves a uniform body of due process standards, thereby facilitating predictability of results; at the same time, it provides jurisdictional rules that are flexible in their application.
II. DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS: CAUSATION, NOTICE, AND RELEVANCE
A. Causation
Due process requires that a nonresident defendant have caused an effect in the forum state before the state may assert jurisdiction over him. 48 Causation is less a definable phenomenon than a label attached to an aggregation of common sense notions. 48 RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 37 ("A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who causes effects in the state by an act done elsewhere with respect to causes of action arising from these effects...."). See Reese & Galston, supra note 34, at 260-63.
An intriguing conceptual question, albeit one that rarely arises in practice, is whether the defendant can be held responsible for an event caused by his failure to act. In Jahner v. Jacob, 252 N.W.2d 1, 8 (N.D. 1977), the court held that the due process causation requirement is satisfied only by a voluntary act. Jurisdiction therefore could not be asserted over two defendants who had received misappropriated property mailed from North Dakota, because no voluntary act tied them to the misappropriation or to the mailing.
Although the result in Jahner may be correct, the court stated the governing principle too broadly. If a defendant realized that his failure to act would cause an event, and if he was able to prevent the occurrence of that event, he had an opportunity to avoid being liable to suit in the forum state. Therefore, the state could fairly assert jurisdiction over him. The real problem is determining when a state may impose a duty to act on out-ofstaters.
Typical examples include a defendant shooting someone in the forum state while standing in an adjacent state" 9 and a defendant sending an injurious product into the state. 5 Most difficulties in establishing causation arise when the defendant did not cause the effect directly. There is no conceptual difficulty with attributing another person's actions to the defendant if he actually or constructively requested them and they are to his benefit. Thus, for jurisdictional purposes, a conspirator's actions are attributed to his coconspirators, 1 an agent's actions are attributed to his principal, 52 Cir. 1974 ), a products liability action in which the defendant filed third-party complaints against the four fabric manufacturers from whom it had purchased fabric resembling the material that went into the plaintiff's shirt. The record showed only that the injurious fabric had come from one of the defendants, but not which one. Jurisdiction therefore was denied over all four because no single defendant had been connected to the plaintiff's injury. The defendant can be deemed jurisdictionally responsible for another's act even though no formal agency relationship exists between the two. All that usually is required is that the defendant have requested the act and that it be for his benefit. See Galgay v. Bulletin Co., 504 F.2d 1062, 1064-65 (2d Cir. 1974 Most courts also recognize that the causation requirement is satisfied when an independent actor transmits the effects of the defendant's actions to the forum. 54 Many commentators 5 and courts, 5 8 however, have asserted that this principle should not extions for benefit of the marriage are grounds for asserting jurisdiction over wife). It therefore has been held that a corporate agent was an agent of the defendant corporate officer when the agent's acts were requested by the officer and they inured to his benefit and not to the corporation's. From a causal standpoint, however, there is no principled justification for treating plaintiffs differently from other persons who transmit effects. To the extent that it might be unfair to assert jurisdiction, the requirement of fair notice, which ensures that the defendant had an opportunity to take precautions to avoid being subject to suit, 63 assures sufficient protection. The fact that the plaintiff rather than the defendant or a third party created the contact is irrelevant to the defendant's ability to take protective measures if he perceives the risk. 4 Moreover, excluding plaintiff-created contacts can produce absurd results. In a recent Alaska products liability action, 5 for example, the defendant, a local merchant, filed a third-party complaint against the out-of-state manufacturer of the injurious product. The manufacturer argued that it should not be subject to jurisdiction because the merchant was responsible for the presence of the product in Alaska. Had that argument been accepted, the manufacturer would have been subject to jurisdiction if the original plaintiff sued it directly, because the effect was transmitted by the middleman merchant; the manufacturer would not have been amenable to suit there if the local merchant sought to impose the same liability. 6 62 In Kulko, the Court stated: Finally, basic considerations of fairness point decisively in favor of appellant's State of domicile as the proper forum for adjudication of this case, whatever the merits of appellee's underlying claim. It is appellant who has remained in the State of the marital domicile, whereas it is appellee who has moved across the continent. 
B. Notice
Due process also requires that jurisdiction can be asserted only over a defendant who could anticipate, ' 7 or who had "fair notice,""' that his out-of-state act would cause an effect in the forum state. 8 9 Courts have struggled with two aspects of the notice requirement: first, of what it is that notice must be had, and second, whether the defendant must purposefully desire the contact with the forum state.
Prior to Kulko, it was thought that jurisdiction could be asserted if the defendant reasonably could have foreseen or anticipated that his actions would cause an effect in the forum. 70 In that case, however, the Supreme Court indicated that the defendant had to be able to anticipate "being 'haled before a Although appropriate in commercial cases, and perhaps properly applied in Kulko itself, such a rule cannot serve as a general standard for determining jurisdiction. For example, where an out-of-state defendant intentionally injures someone in the forum, no court would refuse to assert jurisdiction merely because the defendant had reason to believe the injury would not be discovered or that the victim would select a different forum in which to sue.7 4 Such a result could be avoided by interpreting Kulko to require anticipation of legal liability rather than actual suit on the basis of that liability.
7 5 Even this rule would be too restrictive, however, for it would not permit a state to reach a defendant who caused a potentially (but not predictably) dangerous effect to occur within it. For example, where a nonresident defendant loaned his automobile to a friend who had an accident in the forum,7 1 a rule requiring anticipation of legal liability would deny a state jurisdiction over the defendant unless he could have "reasonably anticipated" the accident. Generally, it makes sense to define fair notice as anticipation of an effect rather than anticipation of legal liability." The fair notice requirement sometimes is made more stringent by requiring that the defendant have acted "purposefully." The Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denckla 7 8 so held, and the Court has reaffirmed this rule consistently without ever defining it.7 9 It is un- 73 See text and notes at notes 101, 107-115 infra. 74 See note 35 supra. 7 "The Court in World-Wide seemed to equate the "haled into court" language with being "subject to suit." 444 U. S. 286, 297 (1980) . 76 It generally is agreed that jurisdiction exists in these circumstances. See Davis v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 294 F.2d 641, 643-48 (4th Cir. 1961) ; cf. Worthley v. Rockville Leasecar, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 185, 187-88 (D. Md. 1971 
) (airplane).
7 In addition to consistency with precedent, see cases cited supra note 67, two other considerations support such a reading. First, the Court has never indicated either the genesis or the explanation for the supposed heightened standard. Second, the purpose of the due process standard set forth in World-Wide, to allow individuals "to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where [it] will and will not render them liable to suit," 444 U.S. at 297, is fulfilled by the traditional, more expansive standard.
78 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1968) (jurisdiction may be asserted over a defendant only if he "purposefully avails [him] self of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws").
79 See, e.g., Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 329 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977) . It has been suggested that the requirement should be ignored as careless dictum. See Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 256, 413 P.2d 732, 735 (1966); International Harvester Co. v. Hendrickson Mfg. Co., 249 Ark. 298, 301-03, 459 S.W.2d 62, 64-65 (1970) . But see Comment, supra note 16, at 1355 (if "defendant has met the purposeful affiliation requirement of Hanson v. Denckla, it has fair notice").
[49:156 clear whether it is the defendant's underlying act or the contact itself that must have been purposeful. Under the former approach, a defendant purposefully avails himself of a contact with the forum state as long as he had fair notice that his act would have an effect there. 8 0 Under this definition, however, Kulko appears to be wrongly decided. Kulko certainly knew that his child would go to California, and he should not have been surprised that she took advantage of benefits provided by the state once she was there. Yet the Court concluded that Kulko's action was not purposeful. 8 1 The case therefore suggests that the contact itself must be purposeful. Kulko's act was not purposeful because he neither desired his daughter's presence in California nor received any personal benefit from her presence there. 82 This concept of purposefulness, emphasizing the contact rather than the act, has been used by lower courts to justify protection of local merchants who knowingly make sales to customers from other states, but who generally do little business with persons from those states." Under this reasoning, a merchant who sells to an occasional nonresident customer may know that his product is going to a foreign state, but because his business does not depend on foreign sales, he has no interest in the product's presence there.
Although the purposefulness requirement seems to achieve the correct result in Kulko and the local merchant cases, jurisdictional In World-Wide, Justice White intimated that the point of the purposeful availment rule was to ensure that the defendant had fair notice that his act might render him liable to suit in the forum state: "When a corporation 'purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,'. . . it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation. analysis under the due process clause should not turn on whether a defendant "consciously desires" the contacts created by his acts in addition to the acts themselves. Universal application of the rule would produce absurd results. Consider the case of a defendant who pollutes in one state knowing that the pollutants will be carried to the forum state. Although the Supreme Court has suggested that the forum state should have jurisdiction, 8 it is unlikely that the polluter "consciously desires" the pollutants' presence in the forum; if the polluter has any desire regarding his effluents, it is probably that they vanish. 5
C. Relevance
Due process also requires that a state may only assert long arm jurisdiction if the effect caused by the defendant is related to the cause of action. 8 6 Although easily grasped, the concept of a relevant event is difficult to articulate. 87 Professor Lea Brilmayer has suggested a readily applicable test: an event is relevant for jurisdictional purposes if it is substantively relevant to the cause of action. 8 This test is grounded on what most agree is the theoretical justification for the relevancy requirement: only a substantively relevant event gives the state a legitimate interest in adjudicating the controversy. 9 It is difficult to imagine a situation where the state would have such an interest if a substantively relevant event had not occurred within its borders. 90
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 500 (1971). 85 Although the purposefulness requirement is inappropriate as a general jurisdictional guide, part III argues that it is proper to focus on whether the defendant consciously sought some benefit from his contact with the forum in cases involving interstate commercial activity.
S. The RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, combines relevance and causation: "A state has the power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who causes effects in the state by an act done elsewhere with respect to causes of action arising from these effects. . .... Id. § 37 (emphasis added). See also Reese & Galston, supra note 34, at 264.
87 The cases and the literature provide little guidance to distinguish relevant from irrelevant events. The RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 37, requires that the cause of action "arise from" the effects of the defendant's actions in the forum state, without explaining what that means. von Mehren and Trautman, supra note 15, at 1144-45, merely state that the cause of action must "arise out of" or be "intimately related to" the defendant's contacts with the forum state.
Brilmayer, supra note 16, at 82. "' See Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1140 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring) (due process prevents state from asserting jurisdiction without a "palpable" interest in the controversy that is "rationally connected with forum policy"); Comment, supra note 16, at 1345-49.
,0 Brilmayer, supra note 16, at 83-84, cites only one lower court opinion in which a
The suggested test is too broad, however, for not every substantively relevant event gives a state a legitimate interest in asserting jurisdiction over the defendant. Consider again Kulko. Although the Kulkos' marriage while on a California vacation may not have been a substantively relevant event in an action for child support, their daughter's conception there undeniably would be. Yet it would be tenuous to argue that California would have a "legitimate interest" in asserting jurisdiction over Kulko if his daughter had been conceived there during a brief vacation.
In most cases, intuition suffices to distinguish relevant from irrelevant events. For example, it seems obvious that Kulko's visits to California years before the child support action arose and his marriage to Mrs. Kulko during one of those visits could not provide California with jurisdiction over him. 91 Although the Brilmayer proposal may be as close as one can come to a comprehensive test, it remains necessary to rely on intuition as a general guide.
III. ADDITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS: COMMERCIAL
CASES
Constitutional restrictions on the power of states to regulate certain activities impose additional limitations on state long arm jurisdiction beyond the minimum due process requirements outlined in part II. For example, it has been suggested that the first amendment requires limitations on the long arm's reach to avoid deterring newspapers from disseminating information in foreign states. 9 2 Similarly, Kulko could be supported on the ground that substantively irrelevant event has been held to support jurisdiction: Cornelison v. Chauney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976) (truck driver involved in an accident on his way to the forum state).
91 The majority opinion acknowledged this inadequacy. 436 U.S. at 92-93. 9' See New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966) , where the court refused to assert jurisdiction over the Times where it was alleged to have circulated defamatory articles in Mississippi and Alabama. Reasoning that "First Amendment considerations surrounding the law of libel require a greater showing of contact to satisfy the due process clause than is necessary in asserting jurisdiction over other types of activity," id. at 572, the court held that jurisdiction should only be asserted over an out-of-state newspaper if its circulation in the forum is sufficient to offset the risk of being subject to suit there. the Constitution limits a state's regulatory power over family matters." 3 These explanations rest on the premise that in areas where the Constitution limits the states' regulatory power, the reach of long arm jurisdiction should be concomitantly limited so that it will not impinge unduly on the protected conduct. In the context of commercial transactions, this part explores the constitutional justifications for stricter limits on jurisdiction and proposes additional rules that serve these purposes.
A. Rules Based on the Commerce Clause
The commerce clause 94 requires courts to invalidate state laws that unreasonably impair interstate commerce. 9 5 Thus, a state's ability to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents who have commercial contacts with its citizens is constrained by "the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which seriously impede it." 96 Jurisdictional standards may impair commerce in two ways. First, the threat of liability to suit in a foreign jurisdiction discourages transactions with foreseeable foreign effects. 97 Second, assertion of long arm jurisdiction may frustrate the REv. 1156 REv. (1980 . At the least, Kulko clearly stands for the proposition that family concerns deserve special consideration in due process analysis. Accord, Demarest v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 791, 798, 165 Cal. Rptr. 641, 644 (1980) . The Supreme Court has described the nature of the "dormant commerce clause" thus:
For a hundred years it has been accepted constitutional doctrine that the commerce clause, without the aid of Congressional legislation, thus affords some protection from state legislation inimical to the national commerce, and that in such cases, where Congress has not acted, this Court, and not the state legislature, is under the commerce clause the final arbiter of the competing demands of state and national interests. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945 551. This criticism is flawed for two reasons. First, in many cases one party will be able to take protective measures without forgoing the transaction, while the other party will not. For example, if a mail order house cannot sue foreign purchasers in its home forum, it will merely increase its insurance and raise prices; it will not abandon the mail order business. At best, then, the criticism is relevant only in those cases where neither party is able to take protective measures. Second, a person is more likely to be deterred by the risk of being sued in a distant forum than by the risk of having to travel to a distant forum to sue. In the latter situation, the person confronted with the risk at least knows that the decision to bear the jurisdictional burden is in his own hands.
. The jurisdictional rule offered here can be viewed as analogous to the damages rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 E.R. 145 (1854): both limit legal liability to that which reasonably could have been anticipated by the defendant and so reduce commercial risk. Cf. C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 138 (1935) (discussing Hadley). Reducing commercial risk or uncertainty facilitates commerce. See, e.g., The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972) . Cf. In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 233-34 (6th Cir. 1972 ) (fairness requires the protection of the defendant's reasonable expectations).
"Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 445 U.S. 907, 911 (1980) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (confusion of current jurisdictional standards "may well have a disruptive effect on commercial relations in which certainty of results is a prime objective").
100 Others have looked to the commerce clause and the federal interest in facilitating interstate commerce as grounds for limiting state long arm jurisdiction. See Carrington & dant whose conduct is commercial in nature-that is, over one who puts a product into the stream of commerce or enters into a contract-unless the following two additional conditions are met. First, the defendant must have been able to anticipate that his conduct might lead to his being sued in the forum state. Second, in light of this perceived risk he must have had a reasonable opportunity to alter, without being forced to forgo, the conduct that caused the effect in the state."'
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the commerce clause does not prohibit imposition of burdens on nonresident commercial actors where they have an opportunity to pass the burdens along to residents. 45-46 n.2 (1940) (recognizing the "danger that, to the extent that the burden falls on economic interests without the state, it is not likely to be alleviated by those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely interests within the state"); Brilmayer, supra note 16, at 95-96 (arguing for restrictions on long arm jurisdic-state asserts jurisdiction over an outsider on the basis of a transaction with a resident, the outsider will have had an opportunity to pass the cost of jurisdictional liability on to the resident.
The first rule embraces in the limited commercial context the "anticipation of suit" standard rejected in its general application in part II-B. 03 The second rule protects the same defendants as the "purposefully avails" standard rejected as a general jurisdictional guide; 10 ' imposition of jurisdictional risks is likely to deter only those defendants who do not consciously seek benefits from their commerical contacts with foreign states. The rules provide a constitutional rationale for limiting jurisdiction where a commercial plaintiff acts unilaterally, without resorting to the artificial plaintiff-created contacts rule, 10 5 and they justify protection of commercial activities without reliance on nonconstitutionallybased forum interest analyses. These rules explain a number of doctrines that courts have developed to limit the long arm in commercial cases. For example, the rules support the commonly accepted proposition that jurisdiction should not be asserted over an out-of-state merchant who only occasionally sells to residents of the forum state. 10 7 The minimum due process requirements as formulated in part II pose no obstacle to jurisdiction if the local merchant has notice that his customer is an out-of-state resident, yet the merchant would not reasonably expect that the sale might lead to a suit against him in the buyer's home state; he is more likely to view his customer's talk of a distant destination as pleasant conversation than as a warning of a potential inconvenient suit. Moreover, the merchant has no real opportunity to charge the occasional nonresident a higher price in light of the unusual jurisdictional risks imposed by the transaction.
The rules also justify the courts' emphasis on the frequency, regularity, and nature of the commercial defendant's contacts with tion over out-of-staters who have no opportunity to pass costs on to residents). The size of the transaction and the extent of the negotiations preceding it also are relevant in considering whether the commerce clause restricts the exercise of the long arm. 10 The courts' concern with protecting passive purchasers is illustrative."' A passive purchaser buys from a foreign seller's inventory at an unnegotiated price; 1 2 almost by definition, he is unable to alter the terms of the transaction. Moreover, most transactions of this sort are so small that the purchaser has no incentive to diminish the risk of jurisdictional liability rather than simply forgo the transaction entirely. The transaction costs of, for example, procuring insurance, negotiating a forum selection clause,' 13 or altering the price to make acceptance of the risk palatable, are too great to make such restruc-turing worthwhile. 114 The long arm therefore must be restricted in such cases.
On the other hand, when a transaction is for a large amount or is preceded by lengthy negotiations, the transaction costs of reducing the risk of liability by acquiring insurance or altering the terms of the bargain become reasonable. Moreover, the more significant the transaction is, the more likely it is that the parties anticipated unusual costs; in the absence of a forum selection clause to the contrary, jurisdiction should be permitted if consistent with minimum due process requirements. Even in passive purchaser situations, failure to restructure the transaction should not automatically suggest an inability to do so, where the transaction is of considerable magnitude or for unique goods. 11 5
C. Summary
The rules proposed here strike the proper balance between state jurisdictional interests and the federal interest in encouraging interstate commerce. The federal interest is satisfied, because it requires only the protection of those who are unaware that a transaction might lead to suit in the forum and of those who would be unable to conduct interstate transactions if they had to bear the risk of jurisdictional liability. The interests of the state are protected, because it may assert jurisdiction over anyone who has significant commercial contacts with it. The interests of commercial actors also are protected, because they can predict with some certainty where their conduct will render them liable to suit. 11 The 11' In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980), the Supreme Court stated that when a commercial defendant "has clear notice that it is subject to suit [in the forum state it] can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection with the state." The rules developed here reject the final alternative, for the commerce clause requires that commercial actors not be forced to choose between forgoing an interstate transaction or accepting the risk of being subject to suit in a distant state. Some protective action short of giving up the transaction must be available.
"' But see Whittaker Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 482 F.2d 1079 (1st Cir. 1973), where three out-of-state defendants each entered into contracts of similar magnitude to purchase the same goods from the plaintiff. One defendant actively participated in the production process by providing specifications and sending representatives to oversee the process. The other two defendants merely asked for what the first one received. Jurisdiction was upheld as to the first defendant and denied as to the other two. The rules outlined above would reject the formalistic active/passive distinction and focus instead on the magnitude and underlying character of the transaction.
" ' The rules focus on the reasonable expectations of parties to a transaction. Contrast Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979), rules therefore encourage efficient treatment of potential jurisdictional costs in interstate transactions: when a person is aware of a potential cost-that is, when he realizes that he and the other party to a transaction have different jurisdictional preferences-he must consider that potential cost in structuring the transaction.
CONCLUSION
This comment has argued that the current balancing approach used in long arm analysis should be replaced with a body of fixed rules. The proposed rules generally are consistent with the results of decided cases, but provide a coherent framework for analysis that emphasizes predictability of result and fidelity to the Constitution.
Under this analysis, due process in the exercise of the long arm is provided by minimum requirements of causation, notice, and relevance. These standards give individuals a sufficient opportunity to avoid a forum's jurisdiction and ensure that the forum has a legitimate interest in regulating the conduct at issue. These due process requirements will allow states expansive long arm power. If further limits on the long arm are imposed, they must be grounded on a constitutional principle restricting a state's power to regulate the particular conduct at issue. Using commercial cases as an illustration, this comment has explored the jurisdictional ramifications of the negative commerce clause. The implications of other constitutional guarantees remain for future study.
Mark P. Gergen cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980) , denying jurisdiction over a defendant who entered into a contract that elicited another's performance in the state because performance there was not required by the contract. The court distinguished between defendants who know a contract will elicit performance in the forum and those who insist on performance there. Yet both are equally able to take protective measures in light of the risk of being sued in the forum. The court argued that absent such a rule, a party to a contract could potentially be liable to suit wherever the other party chose to perform. 597 F.2d at 603. A party will be liable to suit in the forum state, however, only when he reasonably might have expected the other party to perform there. Moreover, the rules offered here would ensure that he had an opportunity to take protective measures in light of that risk. The Seventh Circuit elevated form over substance by focusing on the formal provisions of the contract rather than on the reasonable expectations of the parties to the contract. Cf. 
